Files
palemoon27/caps/nsIPrincipal.idl
roytam1 5f6d4971d0 import changes from `dev' branch of rmottola/Arctic-Fox:
- caps part only: Bug 1178533 - Add nsIInstallPackagedWebapp for registering permissions when navigating to signed packages r=bholley,fabrice,valentin (8174625aab)
- Bug 1299615 - Part 2: Skip ICU source directory in Clang build plugin when searching for implicit conversion constructors. r=Waldo, r=mystor (30a51b6602)
- Bug 1264827 - Part 1: Rename the existing code to make it clear it's checking for template args; r=mystor (2710d7e318)
- Bug 1264827 - Part 2: Add a static analysis to help check Rust wrapped C++ classes for members which are unsafe to memmove; r=mystor (8f053f59cf)
- Bug 1264827 - Part 3: Add the MOZ_NEEDS_MEMMOVABLE_MEMBERS annotation to MFBT; r=froydnj (937622926a)
- Bug 1229769 - We should be able to use DOM promises in the worker debugger;r=khuey (b3b32e9b94)
- Bug 1265035 - Make ~WorkerJSRuntime() handle Initialize() failure better. r=khuey. (67e67fab06)
- Bug 1256428 P1 Add ServiceWorkerJob2 base class. r=jdm (0bedbfa070)
- Bug 1256428 P2 Add ServiceWorkerJobQueue2 class. r=jdm (806e9b242e)
- Bug 1260933 - Part 1: For invalid easing values, print the invalid value. r=birtles (482541cfcb)
- Bug 1260933 - Part 2: For invalid duration values, print the invalid value. r=birtles (5b20918f77)
- Bug 1256428 P3 Add ServiceWorkerUpdateJob2. r=jdm (135e9bf05d)
- Bug 1256428 P4 Add ServiceWorkerRegisterJob2. r=jdm (e790f95b1d)
- Bug 1256428 P5 Add ServiceWorkerUnregisterJob2 class. r=jdm (cf63826b57)
- Bug 1220757 - Add report to console when service worker register fails due to mismatching scope path.r=bkelly (dbbf1a8515)
- Bug 1255621 - Ignore service workers previously registered in non-private windows. r=bkelly (593ebfc612)
- Bug 1241531 - Part 1: Only pop jobs from the queue when the correct job completes. r=ehsan (f8a1ea2fda)
- Bug 1241531 - Part 2: Move Cancel() to ServiceWorkerJob base class. r=ehsan (33ffccb8a4)
- Bug 1241531 - Part 3: Call Cancel() on all service worker jobs. r=ehsan (4cce06ab41)
- Bug 1241531 - Part 4: Make service worker unregister job respect cancelation. r=ehsan (1877cb3919)
- Bug 1261776 Use SafeElementAt() in service worker job queue. r=ehsan (c7a883a087)
- Bug 1238990 P1 ServiceWorkerManager should trigger automatic updates in current process. r=ehsan (c65bded060)
- Bug 1238990 P2 Try to ensure service worker jobs do not run during shutdown. r=ehsan (f816a012f2)
- Bug 1256428 P6 Use ServiceWorkerJobQueue2 and new job classes in ServiceWorkerManager. r=jdm (641af03802)
- Bug 1256428 P0 Fix unified build failures in dom/workers. r=jdm (33aaafd188)
- Bug 1261814: Use the presence of the content global, and not any random global, to determine whether to run the close handler. r=bz (8f182bf345)
- Bug 1256428 P7 Fix wpt update.https.html to expect TypeError per current spec. r=jdm (4c6cad6e0f)
- Bug 1256428 P8 Fix wpt unregister-then-register-new-script.https.html to new spec expectations matching blink's tests. r=jdm (d9191f7002)
- Bug 1226443 P5 Always use first scheduled update timer instead of rescheduling on new events. r=ehsan (7b1b31dcc0)
- Bug 1230341 Hold a strong ref in service worker NS_NewRunnableMethodWithArg uses. r=ehsan a=abillings (2b1d942ae4)
- Bug 1256428 P9 Remove now unused code from ServiceWorkerManager.cpp. r=jdm (7f97035007)
- Bug 1256428 P10 Remove ServiceWorkerRegistrationInfo::mUpdating flag. r=jdm (31fc686d5d)
- Bug 1256428 P11 Don't coalesce SW jobs after the existing job has already resolved its promise. r=jdm (1ce373f98b)
- Bug 1256428 P12 ServiceWorkerUnregisterJob2 should not use ServiceWorkerManager internals. r=jdm (1abe304c3c)
- Bug 1256428 P13 Remove unnecessary ServiceWorkerUnregsterJob2 stop. r=jdm (05d0717b7c)
- Bug 1256428 P14 Remove dead code in SeviceWorkerUpdateJob.cpp. r=jdm (7d1ac1112a)
- Bug 1256428 P15 Perform byte-for-byte comparison check after validating script URL. r=jdm (dc30ec75a9)
- Bug 1256428 P16 Fix some issues calling purgeCache() in ServiceWorkerUpdateJob.cpp. r=jdm (cffe93613a)
- Bug 1256428 P17 Rename service worker job classes to remove "2" suffix. r=jdm (f1d7a6aadf)
- Bug 1256428 P18 Add spec annotations and tweak asserts in ServiceWorkerUpdateJob. r=jdm (1a9c95a5bb)
- Bug 1256428 P19 Address ServiceWorkerUnregisterJob review feedback. r=jdm (2b8775a9ad)
- Bug 1260591 Move ServiceWorkerInfo and ServiceWorkerRegistrationInfo into separate files. r=jdm (2e31a3c002)
- Bug 1266857 Make Clients.claim() use observer document list instead of secondary hashtable. r=bz (2b318072f5)
- Bug 1261428: Migrate the useless setTimeout error message to the bindings infrastructure. r=bz (80d2503978)
- Bug 1263307 P1 Make ServiceWorkerRegistrationInfo::mScope const. r=jdm (b8b03bc594)
- Bug 1263307 P2 Make ServiceWorkerRegistrationInfo worker members private. r=jdm (16773a9134)
- Bug 1263307 P3 Move ServiceWorker update logic into central place in ServiceWorkerRegistrationInfo methods. r=jdm (68b288cbfb)
- Bug 1265761 Clients.matchAll() should treat http windows as secure if devtools are open and http testing is enabled. r=ehsan (100e16ca08)
- Bug 1265795 P1 Uncontrolled service workers when global is removed from document. r=bz (db069b0756)
- Bug 1265795 P2 Add a web-platform-test for the window navigation case. r=bz (6571257e5b)
- Bug 1265795 P3 Assert that controlled documents have an outer window. r=bz (fdc14dbf66)
- Bug 1265795 P4 Always call nsDocument::SetScriptGlobalObject(nullptr) from nsDocument::Destroy(). r=bz (8825c3dbd5)
- Bug 1254194: Add a validator for custom add-on content security policies. r=billm f=aswan (c557dd47ef)
- Bug 1254194: Allow iterating over and inspecting sources of parsed CSP directives. r=ckerschb (2d93cdda56)
- Bug 1142332 - Prevent calling CSP_EnumToKeyword with CSP_HASH. r=ckerschb (15a80ed62f)
- Bug 1236416 - Remove some misc toolkit content UI from Fennec r=margaret (01f7f81c93)
- Bug 1234403 - Part 1: Implement CSSPseudoElement.getAnimations. r=birtles (91ce2e1cae)
- Bug 1234403 - Part 2: Implement document.getAnimations. r=birtles (49afbacadb)
- Bug 1234403 - Part 3: Test for the CSSPseudoElement objects returned by effect.target. r=birtles (bf34dda38f)
- Bug 1234403 - Part 4: Test for the animation order returned by document.getAnimations(). r=birtles (fa8ec8e01f)
- Bug 1234403 - Part 5: Test for CSSPseudoElement.getAnimations. r=birtles (3ef598f2ba)
- Bug 1254418 - Part 1: Support generated-content element for Element.getAnimations. r=birtles (7ae806859a)
- Bug 1254418 - Part 2: Test getAnimations for generated-content elements. r=birtles (b562ec7478)
- Bug 1254761 - Part 1: Implement getAnimations({ subtree: true }). r=smaug (c5419ffec0)
- Bug 1254761 - Part 2: Removes extra whitespaces. r=birtles (2a98381928)
- Bug 1254761 - Part 3: Add tests for AnimationFilter. r=birtles (bdd9b39849)
- Bug 1254194: Apply a content security policy to all WebExtension documents. r=gabor (c3a9f32be8)
- Bug 1257246: Update the version of eslint that mach installs. r=gps (da0481d7e4)
- Bug 1229588: Add a taskcluster test for eslint. r=dustin (e6eff5caf2)
- Bug 1257246: Update lint test image to newer packages of eslint. r=ahal (bcfaf3b5d8)
- Bug 1263637 - Fix eslint 2 warnings for WebExtensions code. r=kmag (16537b22dc)
- Bug 1238177 - fix extension content needs to use the correct user context id origin attribute. r=sicking (834faa0f62)
2024-05-02 16:55:13 +08:00

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
/* Defines the abstract interface for a principal. */
#include "nsISerializable.idl"
%{C++
struct JSPrincipals;
#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
#include "nsTArray.h"
%}
interface nsIURI;
interface nsIContentSecurityPolicy;
interface nsIDOMDocument;
[ptr] native JSContext(JSContext);
[ptr] native JSPrincipals(JSPrincipals);
[ptr] native PrincipalArray(nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> >);
[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(d0391e86-1ad7-4ab0-bb7c-14d6d9967369)]
interface nsIPrincipal : nsISerializable
{
/**
* Returns whether the other principal is equivalent to this principal.
* Principals are considered equal if they are the same principal, or
* they have the same origin.
*/
boolean equals(in nsIPrincipal other);
/**
* Like equals, but takes document.domain changes into account.
*/
boolean equalsConsideringDomain(in nsIPrincipal other);
%{C++
inline bool Equals(nsIPrincipal* aOther) {
bool equal = false;
return NS_SUCCEEDED(Equals(aOther, &equal)) && equal;
}
inline bool EqualsConsideringDomain(nsIPrincipal* aOther) {
bool equal = false;
return NS_SUCCEEDED(EqualsConsideringDomain(aOther, &equal)) && equal;
}
%}
/**
* Returns a hash value for the principal.
*/
[noscript] readonly attribute unsigned long hashValue;
/**
* The codebase URI to which this principal pertains. This is
* generally the document URI.
*/
readonly attribute nsIURI URI;
/**
* The domain URI to which this principal pertains.
* This is null unless script successfully sets document.domain to our URI
* or a superdomain of our URI.
* Setting this has no effect on the URI.
* See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Same-origin_policy#Changing_origin
*/
[noscript] attribute nsIURI domain;
/**
* The origin of this principal's codebase URI.
* An origin is defined as: scheme + host + port.
*/
// XXXcaa this should probably be turned into an nsIURI.
// The system principal's origin should be some caps namespace
// with a chrome URI. All of chrome should probably be the same.
readonly attribute ACString origin;
/**
* Returns whether the other principal is equal to or weaker than this
* principal. Principals are equal if they are the same object or they
* have the same origin.
*
* Thus a principal always subsumes itself.
*
* The system principal subsumes itself and all other principals.
*
* A null principal (corresponding to an unknown, hence assumed minimally
* privileged, security context) is not equal to any other principal
* (including other null principals), and therefore does not subsume
* anything but itself.
*/
boolean subsumes(in nsIPrincipal other);
/**
* Same as the previous method, subsumes(), but takes document.domain into
* account.
*/
boolean subsumesConsideringDomain(in nsIPrincipal other);
%{C++
inline bool Subsumes(nsIPrincipal* aOther) {
bool subsumes = false;
return NS_SUCCEEDED(Subsumes(aOther, &subsumes)) && subsumes;
}
inline bool SubsumesConsideringDomain(nsIPrincipal* aOther) {
bool subsumes = false;
return NS_SUCCEEDED(SubsumesConsideringDomain(aOther, &subsumes)) && subsumes;
}
%}
/**
* Checks whether this principal is allowed to load the network resource
* located at the given URI under the same-origin policy. This means that
* codebase principals are only allowed to load resources from the same
* domain, the system principal is allowed to load anything, and null
* principals can only load URIs where they are the principal. This is
* changed by the optional flag allowIfInheritsPrincipal (which defaults to
* false) which allows URIs that inherit their loader's principal.
*
* If the load is allowed this function does nothing. If the load is not
* allowed the function throws NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI.
*
* NOTE: Other policies might override this, such as the Access-Control
* specification.
* NOTE: The 'domain' attribute has no effect on the behaviour of this
* function.
*
*
* @param uri The URI about to be loaded.
* @param report If true, will report a warning to the console service
* if the load is not allowed.
* @param allowIfInheritsPrincipal If true, the load is allowed if the
* loadee inherits the principal of the
* loader.
* @throws NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI if the load is not allowed.
*/
void checkMayLoad(in nsIURI uri, in boolean report,
in boolean allowIfInheritsPrincipal);
/**
* A Content Security Policy associated with this principal.
*
* Use this function to query the associated CSP with this principal.
*/
[noscript] readonly attribute nsIContentSecurityPolicy csp;
/*
* Use this function to query a CSP associated with this principal.
* If no CSP is associated with this principal then one is created
* internally and setRequestContext is called on the CSP using aDocument.
*
* Please note if aDocument is null, then setRequestContext on the
* CSP object is called using the current principal.
*/
[noscript] nsIContentSecurityPolicy ensureCSP(in nsIDOMDocument aDocument);
/**
* A speculative Content Security Policy associated with this
* principal. Set during speculative loading (preloading) and
* used *only* for preloads.
*
* If you want to query the CSP associated with that principal,
* then this is *not* what you want. Instead query 'csp'.
*/
[noscript] readonly attribute nsIContentSecurityPolicy preloadCsp;
/*
* Use this function to query a speculative CSP associated with this
* principal. If no speculative CSP is associated with this principal
* then one is created internally and setRequestContext is called on
* the CSP using aDocument.
*
* Please note if aDocument is null, then setRequestContext on the
* speculative CSP object is called using the current principal.
*/
[noscript] nsIContentSecurityPolicy ensurePreloadCSP(in nsIDOMDocument aDocument);
/**
* The CSP of the principal in JSON notation.
* Note, that the CSP itself is not exposed to JS, but script
* should be able to obtain a JSON representation of the CSP.
*/
readonly attribute AString cspJSON;
/**
* Returns the jar prefix of the principal.
* The jar prefix is a string that can be used to isolate data or
* permissions between different principals while taking into account
* parameters like the app id or the fact that the principal is embedded in
* a mozbrowser.
* Some principals will return an empty string.
* Some principals will assert if you try to access the jarPrefix.
*
* The jarPrefix is intended to be an opaque identifier. It is currently
* "human-readable" but no callers should assume it will stay as is and
* it might be crypto-hashed at some point.
*/
readonly attribute AUTF8String jarPrefix;
/**
* A dictionary of the non-default origin attributes associated with this
* nsIPrincipal.
*
* Attributes are tokens that are taken into account when determining whether
* two principals are same-origin - if any attributes differ, the principals
* are cross-origin, even if the scheme, host, and port are the same.
* Attributes should also be considered for all security and bucketing decisions,
* even those which make non-standard comparisons (like cookies, which ignore
* scheme, or quotas, which ignore subdomains).
*
* If you're looking for an easy-to-use canonical stringification of the origin
* attributes, see |originSuffix| below.
*/
[implicit_jscontext]
readonly attribute jsval originAttributes;
/**
* A string of the form !key1=value1&key2=value2, where each pair represents
* an attribute with a non-default value. If all attributes have default
* values, this is the empty string.
*
* The value of .originSuffix is automatically serialized into .origin, so any
* consumers using that are automatically origin-attribute-aware. Consumers with
* special requirements must inspect and compare .originSuffix manually.
*
* originsuffix are intended to be a replacement for jarPrefix, which will
* eventually be removed.
*/
readonly attribute AUTF8String originSuffix;
/**
* The base domain of the codebase URI to which this principal pertains
* (generally the document URI), handling null principals and
* non-hierarchical schemes correctly.
*/
readonly attribute ACString baseDomain;
const short APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED = 0;
const short APP_STATUS_INSTALLED = 1;
const short APP_STATUS_PRIVILEGED = 2;
const short APP_STATUS_CERTIFIED = 3;
/**
* Gets the principal's app status, which indicates whether the principal
* corresponds to "app code", and if it does, how privileged that code is.
* This method returns one of the APP_STATUS constants above.
*
* Note that a principal may have
*
* appId != nsIScriptSecurityManager::NO_APP_ID &&
* appId != nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID
*
* and still have appStatus == APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED. That's because
* appId identifies the app that contains this principal, but a window
* might be contained in an app and not be running code that the app has
* vouched for. For example, the window might be inside an <iframe
* mozbrowser>, or the window's origin might not match the app's origin.
*
* If you're doing a check to determine "does this principal correspond to
* app code?", you must check appStatus; checking appId != NO_APP_ID is not
* sufficient.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned short appStatus;
/**
* Gets the id of the app this principal is inside. If this principal is
* not inside an app, returns nsIScriptSecurityManager::NO_APP_ID.
*
* Note that this principal does not necessarily have the permissions of
* the app identified by appId. For example, this principal might
* correspond to an iframe whose origin differs from that of the app frame
* containing it. In this case, the iframe will have the appId of its
* containing app frame, but the iframe must not run with the app's
* permissions.
*
* Similarly, this principal might correspond to an <iframe mozbrowser>
* inside an app frame; in this case, the content inside the iframe should
* not have any of the app's permissions, even if the iframe is at the same
* origin as the app.
*
* If you're doing a security check based on appId, you must check
* appStatus as well.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long appId;
/**
* Gets the ID of the add-on this principal belongs to.
*/
readonly attribute AString addonId;
/**
* Gets the id of the user context this principal is inside. If this
* principal is inside the default userContext, this returns
* nsIScriptSecurityManager::DEFAULT_USER_CONTEXT_ID.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long userContextId;
/**
* Returns true iff the principal is inside a browser element. (<iframe
* mozbrowser mozapp> does not count as a browser element.)
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean isInBrowserElement;
/**
* Returns true if this principal has an unknown appId. This shouldn't
* generally be used. We only expose it due to not providing the correct
* appId everywhere where we construct principals.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean unknownAppId;
/**
* Returns true iff this is a null principal (corresponding to an
* unknown, hence assumed minimally privileged, security context).
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean isNullPrincipal;
/**
* Returns true iff this principal corresponds to a codebase origin.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean isCodebasePrincipal;
/**
* Returns true iff this is an expanded principal.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean isExpandedPrincipal;
/**
* Returns true iff this is the system principal.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean isSystemPrincipal;
/**
* Returns true if this principal's origin is recognized as being on the
* whitelist of sites that can use the CSS Unprefixing Service.
*
* (This interface provides a trivial implementation, just returning false;
* subclasses can implement something more complex as-needed.)
*/
[noscript,notxpcom,nostdcall] bool IsOnCSSUnprefixingWhitelist();
};
/**
* If nsSystemPrincipal is too risky to use, but we want a principal to access
* more than one origin, nsExpandedPrincipals letting us define an array of
* principals it subsumes. So script with an nsExpandedPrincipals will gain
* same origin access when at least one of its principals it contains gained
* sameorigin acccess. An nsExpandedPrincipal will be subsumed by the system
* principal, and by another nsExpandedPrincipal that has all its principals.
* It is added for jetpack content-scripts to let them interact with the
* content and a well defined set of other domains, without the risk of
* leaking out a system principal to the content. See: Bug 734891
*/
[uuid(f3e177Df-6a5e-489f-80a7-2dd1481471d8)]
interface nsIExpandedPrincipal : nsISupports
{
/**
* An array of principals that the expanded principal subsumes.
* Note: this list is not reference counted, it is shared, so
* should not be changed and should only be used ephemerally.
*/
[noscript] readonly attribute PrincipalArray whiteList;
};